Introduction
Every mother is a working mother, but women as workers and as mothers have a long history of struggle in maintaining their rights in their productive and reproductive roles in society. Since the 1960s demographic and economic trends -demonstrating that the economic perfonnance of women in the economy is substantial -have induced many countries, including New Zealand, to reorient social policies which reflect more clearly the needs of working women. Towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, when the first laws to "'protect" working women -mainly focusing on maternity -were introduced in various industrial countries, the number of working women outside the household was very low. Since that time, however, the participation of womẽn in the workforce has grown at an extraordinary rate.
With that increased participation havẽ grown substantial bodies of domestic and international legislation, policy and practice seeking to combat discrimination against women in the workforce. One of the most subversive forms of discrimination has been that against working mothers -discrimination based often on inherited and outmoded social customs, beliefs and values. Yet working mothers, as much as ever, need financial support and job security during all stages of reproduction -during pregnancy, confinement, nursing and childrearing. ..
The 1987 Act provides for unpaid maternity, paternity and leave ef to be shared between the parents (where those parents have each for at least I 0 hours a week for the 12 months prior to the natural or adopted child -of up to 52 weeks in total and protecls the jeba af are on such leave. The Act also provides a complex set of application for parental leave and on the giving of notice of (minute, 1988 The PLEP 1987 at s.41 . . thus creates a presumption -in favour of a parent's right to return from parental leave to the position slhe held on taking that leave -rebuttable only (a) when the position held is made redundant; 5 or (b) when the position held is a "key position" -and even though the position is a key position -a temporary replacement to take the place of the parent for the duration of that leave is "not reasonably practicable due to the key position occupied". [ 1990] 3 NZILR 871, Travis J considered at page 881 that a "redundancy situation'' in the 1987 Act could: ". . . cover a situation where jobs are or will disappear because of a superfluity or excess of manpower, as distinct from circumstances in which the employment of an individual employee is terminated by reason of that individual being surplus to the requirements of the employer . . . We therefore consider that the words "redundancy situation" can be construed as a reference to both a position becoming superfluous to an employer's needs, as well as the worker no longer being required."
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The central thesis of this article is that s.41 of the 1987 Act requires a four-step process to be successfully negotiated by an employer before the presumption, establishing the parent's right to return to \vork after parental leave, is rebutted. Firstly, it is necessary for the e1nployer to establish that the parent occupies a key position in the employer's enterprise. However, that of itself, will not be sufficient to disestablish a parent's right to return to \Vork. Secondly, there must be present the further factor that a temporary replacement to take that parent's place would not be reasonably practicable. Thirdly, that temporary replacement must be not reasonably practicable because of some intrinsic quality of the key position which n1akes such temporary replacement "not reasonably practicable". And fourthly, that the test of "reasonable practicability" meets the legal definition of that term. In all other circumstances save that of redundancy -quite irrespective of the difficulties or operational inefficiencies experienced by the employer -the employer is obliged to keep the parent's position open for his or her return.
It is therefore apparent, even from this cursory interpretation of s.41 of the 1987 Act, that for the section to be given its intended effect and to meet its intended purpose, a strict interpretation is both warranted and required. This strict interpretation of the section is readily justified by a number of don1estic and international considerations surrounding the introduction of the 1980 and 1987 Acts.
Policy considerations
The PLEP Act I 98 7 is an act to prescribe minimum , entitlements with respect to parental leave for all \Vorkers and to protect the right of workers during both pregnancy and parental leave. That description of the Act comes from its long title and is important insofar as it denotes the double thrust of the legislation -towards both the provision of the leave and the protection of the parent's , employment. It is, of course, the second aim of the legislation \Vhich is arguably the n1ore important since the provision of leave without any right to return to \Vork \Vould effectively be the legislative provision of a right to dismiss pregnant \Vorkers and their partners. is connection between the right to :return to work after parental leave and the prohibition of dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or parental leave is so close that in England, for example, the parental leave and employment protection provis. ions are contained in that country's Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 -the same legislation as establishes the industrial law concept of "unjustified dismissal" as contrasted to the common law's "wrongful dismissal". For a \Vide-ranging consideration of parental leave and employment protection internationally see "Protection of Working Mothers: An ILO Global Survey ( 1964 -1984 ", Women At Work 2184 (ILO, Geneva, 1984 ) .
[ 1980] NZPD 5510.
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The objective of the Bill is to prescribe minimum requirements in respect of maternity leave and protection from dismissal by reason of pregnancy for all women.
• • • The philosophy underpinning the Bill is based on the conviction that \VOrking women should be able to start a fan1ily without having to leav, e en1ployment permanently or have their . 8 employment record severely disrupted.
Similarly, the Honourable Aussie Malcolm, the member for Eden" summed up the reasons for which the Government had found it necessary to introduce the Bill. He stated that:
We would not have to do it if society were perfect, because what the Bill contains is selfevident. Howev, er, because there is still such a deep prejudice in our society against women, particularly child-bearing women, it is necessary for us to legislate a minimum standarda minimum standard that I hope will be exceeded in practice in many instances.
We are saying that, regrettably, prejudice against women, and particularly against child bearing women, is so deeply ingrained in society that w, e are obliged to pass this small, con1plex Bill, with all its restrictions on people, to oblige employers to provide certain rights to pregnant \Vomen.
10
• He stated that:
Over at least the last I 00 years, there has been a definite trend to\vards improving the legal status of women and their evẽryday conditions of life. Broadly speaking, it is a trend towards social justice. The right to vote, to hold separate property, to equal pay for ẽqual work, and the various other rights to be free from discrimination, are all matters of social justice. Maternity leave provisions must be viewed against that background. Those provisions are aimed at giving a female employee the right of choke to continue her employment career after an interruption for purposes of childbirth, early nurturing and to make arrangements for suitable continuing care of the child. Social justice is not achieved without cost or without changes to the existing order. An improved position for one person A compilation of demographic data regarding working women and childbirth 16 prepared by the Working Women's Resource Centre discloses substantial statistical validation for effective parental leave legislation. It is apparent from that compilation that an increasing number of women are entering the workforce.
17
Most women have entered the labour market by the ages of 18 to 19.
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At the same time, childbearing is occurring later in women, s lives. The average age of women at the birth of their first child has risen from 23.7 years in 1964 to 26 years in 1985.
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Most births now occur when the mother is between 25 to 29 years old. 20 Therefore, women spend more time in the workforce before giving birth (between six and eleven years) and havẽ more time to develop an established career path.
At the same time, women are having fewẽr children 21 and are completing childbearing at an earlier age -75 percent of women born in 1910 completed their childbearing by the age of 34 while 75 percent of women born in 1945 completed their childbearing by the time they werẽ 28 years old. 22 According to one survey completed by Susan Shipley, the majority of women return to the workforce before their youngest child is one year old.
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• These statistics evidence the need to consider the career disruption which occurs with pregnancy and childbirth. This interruption frequently causes women to lose their jobs. Typically, on re-entering the workforce, these women must start at lower positions with lower pay. They lose the seniority necessary for promotion and for the establishment of job security during periods when the economy falters. The resuh of this discontinuity is that women's careers are perceived as being less valuable than men's. By eliminating the stereotype that the mother should give up her paid employment simply because she is the childbearer, maternity leave, coupled with the right to return to the mother's job, has the potential to interrupt this cycle. Ibid, 542-543.
[1981] 1 NZLR 222.
[ 1978] QB 36.
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Today, therefore, "'' e have to construe and apply section 30 [of the Education Act 1944 (UK)] not against the background of the la\v and society of 1944 but in a multi-racial society which has accepted international obligations and enact, ed statutes designed to eliminate discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, colour or sex. Further, it is no longer possible to argue that because the international treaty obligations of the United Kingdom do not become law unless enacted by Parliament our courts pay no regard to our international obligations. They pay very serious regard to them: in particular they will interpret statutory language and apply common law principles, wherever possible, so as to r, each a conclusion consistent with our inte. rnational obligations." It has been increasingly recognised in recent years that, , even though treaty obi igations not implemented by J, egislation ar· e not part of our domestic law, the Courts in inte. rpreting legislation will do their best confonnably · with the subject matter and the policy of the legislation to see that their decisions are , consistent with our international obligations. Bearing in mind the gr, eat contribution of women to the we' lfare of the family and to the devẽlopment of society, so far not fully recognised, the social significance of maternity and the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and aware that the role of women in procrẽation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsibility between mẽn and \vomen and society as a whole.
Article 11 (2)(a) and (b) states:
In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures: (a)
To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity lẽave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status; (b)
To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances ... "
By its ratification of these covenants, New Zealand has accepted the specific obligations under them. This includes making such changes in legislation and practice as are necessary to fulfil those obligations. The PLEP Act 1987 was enacted after New Zealand had ratified both the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination Against Women, and hence it is required to receive an interpretation not inconsistent with New Zealand's obligations under those documents. The later ratification of the "Women's Convention", in particular, has strengthened and endorsed the implication that a denial of parental leave for women (including the prevention of reinstatement after the period of parental leave) is a form of discrimination against women based on their sex. As a measure combatting such discrimination, the 1987 Act again requires an interpretation which achieves or furthers New Zealand's international legal obligations.
There have also been a substantial number of ILO Conventions and Recommendations regarding maternity and parental leave and employment protection which have come into force since 1921. By way of summary, those documents establish, as a right, maternity leave and the provision of job security for the duration of that leave. As Article 8( 1) of the Declaration of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Women Workers, adopted at the 1975 International Labour Conference, states:
There shall be no discrimination against women workers on the grounds of pregnancy and childbirth and women bearing a child shall be protected from dismissal during the entire period of pregnancy and maternity leave. They shall have the right to resume their employment without loss of acquired rights.
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Pheroze Jagose To say \vhat is a key position, regard must be had to s.l6(2)(a) and (b) and "other things". Looking broadly at Parliament's purpose, and the attainment of its objects, we think the pr, esumption was intended to be irrebuttabl, e in cases where persons with elementary skills were employed in large , enterprises and hence did not occupy key positions. We think Parliament intended the test (of temporary replacement being not reasonably practicable) to be applied: (i) In small enterprises wher, e a person with elementary skills might be said to occupy a key position in that enterprise and might have to be replaced on a permanent basis~ and (ii)
In all enterprises, including larger enterprises \vhere only a fairly well trained or skiHed person might be said to occupy a key position and might have to be replaced on a permanent basis." (Underlining the author's.)
Simply because a person possesses vast skills and has undergone enormous periods of training will not be sufficient to say that the position held is a key position. Similarly, the size of the employer's enterprise is not decisive of any position within that enterprise being a key position. Those factors of skills and training required in the job (stressing the phrase "required in the job") and the size of the employer's enterprise need to be taken into consideration when deciding whether a position is a key position. But it is still necessary to decide for what purpose regard is to be had to those factors. According to Williamson J, the purpose for having regard to those factors is to see whether or not the position held needs to be "filled on a pennanent basis" -permanent, that is, as opposed to temporary.
This seems to be a correct interpretation of the phrase "key position" -that it is a position of such a crucial and pivotal naturẽ to the efficient operation of the employer's enterprise that it is required to be filled on a permanent basis. It seems correct for two reasons:
(a) The first step of denying a parent his or her right to return to work after parental leave ought only be able to be taken in circumstances of extreme and established need by the employer -after aU, the entire thrust of the 1987 Act, when considered in its domestic and international context, is to guarantee parents' job security and unimpaired career progression on their return from parental leave.
The only reason which will operate so as to destroy that entitlement is that a temporary replacement for the parent on parental leave is not reasonably practicable. It is necessary, in the scheme of the Act, to reach a position where an employer needs to be able to deny a parent his or her right to return and that need will only be acceptably demonstrated by the employer showing that the position held by the parent is required to be filled on a penuanent basis -pennanent, as was stated before, as opposed to temporary.
Even where an employer can show the position is required to be filled on a pettnanent basis, the 1987 Act expects of such an employer still greater flexibility in meeting the right Thus the exception to the general presun1ption that a his or her return from parental leave ought be strictly definition to that which is contemplated by the ov..U That being so, it now becomes necessary to practicability" of a temporary replacemen.t. 
Parental Leave 145
Such an interpretation is clearly necessary of s.41 and of the 1987 Act as a whole. It is particularly relevant to the proper interpretation of the meaning of "reasonable practicability" because the definition of those words similarly require an understanding of the Act's true intent, meaning and spirit. When the words "reasonably practicable" are interpreted in a manner coherent with the direction given by s.S(j) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 that interpretation will be as strict as that otherwise urged by this article.
In Porter v Bandridge 39 , a decision of the English Court of Appeal -a case also cited and noted by Williamson J in the Af.lZ Bank case 40 , Ormrod LJ considered the different interpretations of the phrase "reasonably practicable". The facts involved the question of whether a complainant, who had failed to bring his complaint for unfair dismissal within the statutory time-limit, could establish that it was not reasonably practicable to bring the complaint within the time period. The case thus uses the phrase not in relation to a responsibility of an employer -as in the PLEP Act 1987 -but in rẽlation to a time limit for starting proceedings by a worker. However, in the course of his judgn1ent., Ormrod LJ provided a useful sun1mary of the various judicial interpretations of the \vords "reasonably practicable" stating:
The phrase is one which parliamentary draughtsmen find useful, in various contexts, to express the intention of Parliament that the provision which it qualifies is not to be applied with the inflexibility of a mechanical or automatic process, but with due regard to the constraints to which human beings are subject. These, of course, vary according to both circumstances and subject matter. In consequence the meaning given to the \Yords "reasonably practicable" varies with the context in which it is used. At one end of the spectrum are the cases relating to the statutory duties placed upon ẽmployers to take steps to protect their employees. There the phrase is strictly interpreted. Some distinction is recognised betv.'een "possible", "practkable" and "reasonably practicable", but the onus of proving that a precaution is not reasonably practicable is a heavy one. At the other end is s.25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which requires the Court exercise its po\vers so as to place the parties "so far as is practicable" in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down. In that context its meaning is equivalent in ordinary language to "practical" i.e. it is taken to mean that the Court should do the best it can in the circumstances to achieve the virtually unattainable goal set by the Act. "
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It is therefore necessary to consider some of those cases which relate to the statutory duties placed upon employers to take steps to protect their workers. Typically, such cases involve the application of various health and safety legislation in the furtherance of which employers are required to take certain precautions "where reasonably practicable". Thus s.49 of the Coal Mines Act 1911 (UK) required mine-owners to make secure the roof and sides of every travelling road and working place unless such was not reasonably practicable. In the same case, Lord Keith of Avonholm stated that:
It was no doubt a physical or engineering possibility for the mine owners in the present case to have carried out the precautions which were carried out after the accident. These might not have ensured absolute security. But 1 agree with my noble and learned friend, Lord Tucker, that if absolute security is not reasonably practicable that does not excuse the ' mine owner from taking those reasonably practicable steps that will give a lesser degree of security. But it is not the precautions in themselves which have to be reasonably practicable. It is the observance of those prẽcautions that is required so far as may be reasonably practicable.
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Three points arise out of this case:
(a) Firstly, a precaution which is practicable must be taken unlẽss unreasonable.
Secondly, the more a precaution is likely to fulfil the purpose of the legislation which embodies it, the less likely will a court find the provision of that precaution to be not reasonably practicable.
Thirdly, it is not the purpose of the legislation which is required to be reasonably practicable to achieve, but the means of providing for the achievẽment of that purpose.
Therefore, using this analysis in a consideration of s.41 of the PLEP Act 1987, it first becomes apparent that the purpose of the legislation, aside from that policy discussed earlier, insofar as s.4l is concerned, is that of employment protection for parents while on parental leave.
Secondly, the provision of a temporary replacement will absolutely achieve that purpose. The reasonable practicability of such provision of a temporary replacement imposes a very substantial onus on the employer.
As to the third point of the analysis, the specific tenus of s.41 of the 1987 Act point to exactly what the legislation requires to be taken into consideration in assessing whether a temporary replacement is reasonably practicable. If s.41 of the Act stopped at the words ''reasonably practicable", then an employer might be able to discharge the onus upon him or her by showing that, in all the circumstances, the means by which the employer might provide for the achievement of the purpose of the 1987 Act was not reasonably practicable --if, for example, the employer was able to show that, despite extensive attempts to find a temporary replacement, none were available. The presumption is not rebuttable on the sole ground that a temporary replacement is not reasonably practicable. There must be present the further element that such nonpracticability must be due to the key position occupied. The words of the statute in our opinion need to be approached with some care . . . It is readily appar· ent that the words "reasonably practicable" must be considered with the following words "due to the key position occupied" (emphasis supplied). While the proposition is accepted for present purposes that the worker's position was a "key position", it is necessary for the employer to establish that it was not reasonably practicable to put in a temporary replacement because of the key nature of the position.
[Section 41] provides that if a question about the rights of a worker to parental leave comes before the Court the Court must presume in all situations that the employer has the ability to keep open the worker's position for the worker until the end of the period of leave. That is the obligation imposed upon the Court at the outset. It clearly gives the worker's rights predominance over those of the employer. In order to ease the effects of that requirement, the Act provides at s.41 (I) that it will not apply if "the employer proves that the employee's position cannot be kept open . . . because a temporary replacement is not reasonably practicable due to the key position occupied within the employer's enterprise by the employee". Obviously a crucial point is whether the position is a key position, but with that the employer must further establish that it is because of the nature of the position itself that a temporary replacement is not reasonably practicable. That narrows considerably the range of relief offered by the Act to employers. Further to that, the relief is not available "unless the employer proves . .. ", that is, until the employer proves the necessary facts.
• • • In other words, it is our view that once the facts giving rise to a period of parental leave arise a worker is entitled to such leave and the employer must honour that entitlement if application is made irrespective of cost or inconvenience; this is the requirement of ss.41 (I) and 66(2) of the Act, and it remains so until . . . the employer has proved, i.e. has demonstrated or otherwise established, that the position is (i) a "key position" and that (ii) because of the nature of the position it is not reasonably practicable to entrust the duties of that position to a temporary replacement. position. " 54 There must be something about the nature of the key position itself which makes such temporary replacement "not reasonably practicable".
To return to the decision of A1arshal/ v Gotham Co Ltcf
5
, it \vas held therein that the n1ore a precaution is likely to fulfil the purpose of the legislation which en1bodies it, the less likely is it that a Court will find the provision of that precaution to be not reasonably practicable. The provision of a temporary replacen1ent will absolutely achieve the purpose of s.41 of the PLEP Act 1987 by affording parents employment protection while on parental leave. There is an extraordinarily high onus of proof on the part of employers seeking to discharge that onus -. made even more stringent by the wording in the Act which requires that the onus be discharged only in relation to the non-practicability of a temporary replacement due to the key position held.
However, ev· en if an employer can prove that the parent is in a key position, that a temporary replacement is not reasonably practicable and not reasonably practicable by reason of the key position occupied, the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Ed»'ards v National Coal Boarcf 6 makes it clear that there is a further consideration which is required to be proved by the employer before being able to rebut the presumption that the worker's position will be able to be kept open for the worker's return from parental leave. That further consideration, which will decide the reasonable practicability, in the above circumstances, of kẽeping the worker's position open, involves "a computation" weighing up the worker's rights to return to his or her position at the end of parental leave against the employer's right to have the position occupied on a permanent -as opposed to temporary -basis.
That computation will have to answer the questions: What is so crucial and pivotal about the position occupied by the worker that, by simply occupying that position, the worker has denied himself or herself any ability to return to the position at the completion of his or her parental leave? What is the interest of the employer in having that position occupied on s G a permanent basis -rather than on a temporary one -which is of such a weight that it outweighs the worker's statutory right to return to his or her work after completing parental leave? The rights of the worker are intended to concept and effect of the Act is that in certain of right and that the employer must make the right is not infringed.
Conclusion
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At a time when employers are calling for laJlDIJ comply with their demands, the Labour --be applauded in recognising that a different workers of their employers and in requiring employer is to bend to the needs of the S7 Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (Jrd ed.) Sl Supra, n.2, 6.
